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Air Combat

Air Combat

A Holistic Approach to Combat Identification by Maj Edward Ospital and Maj Adam Wojack

Combat Identification (CID) is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects (friendly, enemy or neutral) throughout the Joint battlespace to the extent that with high confidence, timely application of military options and weapons resources can occur.  Combat Identification is achieved through proficient application of a family of situational awareness and target identification capabilities, and adherence to doctrine, unit tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), and approved rules of engagement (ROE) that directly support a combatant’s shoot/don’t shoot decision for detected objects in their battlespace. The purpose of CID is to improve unit combat effectiveness while at the same time preventing fratricide and minimizing collateral damage.  CID is the process that human shooters or sensors go through to identify entities on the battlefield prior to making shoot/don’t shoot decisions.  To perform CID, the warfighter uses all available means at his disposal to sort the entities on the battlefield prior to applying combat power or fires effects.  The whole point is to enable the warfighter to maximize the effects of lethal fires against the enemy, while at the same time reducing or eliminating the effects of fires on friendly or neutral personnel, equipment or facilities. While CID is a complex series of linked systems, procedures and doctrine—when it is effective, it is simple and transparent.  When it is ineffective, its results can be tragic and disastrous.  A recent example of the “links” in the CID chain (Family of Systems [“See” the entity] + Training [“Identify” the entity] + Doctrine/TTP/ROE [“Engage” the entity]) being broken in the Global War on Terrorism is the highly publicized Pat Tillman incident. 

 Fratricide in Afghanistan

While on patrol in a Taliban-infested sector of Afghanistan’s Patktia province, an element of the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, became bogged down because of a broken HMMWV. The segment of the platoon with Corporal Pat Tillman, Serial 1, passed through a canyon and was near its north rim. The other segment, Serial 2, changed route plans because of poor road conditions that hindered the recovery of a broken HMMWV being towed by a locally acquired vehicle. Serial 2 entered the same canyon from the south. Serial 2 did not have the ability to communicate their situation and change of route to Serial 1 due to the rugged terrain. Upon entering the canyon, Serial 2 came under mortar and small arms fire from Afghan Taliban fighters.  Rangers in Serial 1 heard the initial explosion that preceded the attack. CPL Tillman and two other fire team leaders were ordered to head toward the attackers.  The canyon’s walls prevented them from radioing their positions to their colleagues, just as Serial 2 had not radioed its change in plans.  CPL Tillman’s group moved toward the north-south ridge to face the canyon. The light was dimming. “It was like twilight,” one Ranger in the fight recalled. “You couldn’t see colors, but you could see silhouettes.” Another Ranger felt the light was “still pretty good.” A sergeant with Tillman on the ridge recalled he “could actually see the enemy from the high northern ridge line. I could see their muzzle flashes.” The presumed Taliban guerrillas were about half a mile away. Tillman took another Ranger and an Afghan ally down the slope “into a position where he could engage the enemy,” the sergeant recalled.  A Ranger nearby watched Tillman take cover. “I remember not liking his position; I had just seen a red tracer come up over us…which immediately struck me as being an M240 tracer…at that time the issue of friendly fire began turning over in my mind.” As Serial 2 pulled alongside the ridge, the gunners poured an undisciplined barrage of hundreds of rounds into the area Tillman and the other members of Serial 1 had taken position. The first to die was the Afghan, whom the Rangers in Serial 2 mistook for a Taliban fighter. Under fire, Tillman and almost a dozen others on the ridge “shouted, they waved their arms, and they screamed some more.”  Tillman then used a smoke grenade to mark their position and firing ceased for a few moments. The Rangers in Serial 1 thought the engagement was over and got up from their position. The HMMWV then moved to a position of advantage and resumed firing, killing Tillman in the second engagement. To use this tragic example to better explain CID, you must first understand its basic formula: Situational Awareness (SA) + Target Identification (TI) = Combat Identification (CID.) 

Combat Identification: The process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects (friendly, enemy, neutral) in the Joint battlespace to the extent that with high confidence, timely application of military options and weapons resources can occur (CID MA ICD).  Combat ID is achieved through proficient application of a family of situational awareness and target identification capabilities, and adherence to doctrine, unit TTP, and approved ROE that directly supports a combatant’s ”shoot/don’t shoot” decision for detected objects in his/her battlespace. 

Combat Effectiveness: (as related to Combat ID) the ability of a friendly unit to rapidly and accurately sort and characterize detected objects within the battlespace in order to allow for the timely application of combat power and fires effects against an enemy force or target (to destroy, neutralize, suppress or disrupt), with the least risk of death, injury or damage to friendly and neutral forces, entities, facilities and equipment ((prevention of fratricide and collateral damage) definition by the TCM PBC/CID).

Situational Awareness (SA): SA consists of reported friendly (blue), enemy (red), neutral and unknown entities normally displayed on a computer screen or manually posted on a map.  For the purposes of CID, we will only describe SA as it relates to automated and reported information using available C2/SA systems.  There are three key attributes of SA – accuracy/timeliness of reporting; density of blue position, location, information (PLI) generating systems; and interoperability of friendly force C2/SA systems in the affected battlespace.  SA is sent to and displayed in two places—to the Common Operational Picture (COP) located in Command Posts for C2 purposes; and to individual vehicle/aircraft/soldier platform C2/SA display devices for both C2 and Combat ID purposes.  The latter directly supports shoot/don’t shoot decision-making by human shooters and sensors in close proximity to enemy forces on the battlefield.

When CPL Tillman’s unit lost SA of where its subordinate elements were in relation to each other, the situation deteriorated:  two friendly forces converged on one another without communications.  Several systems could have prevented this loss of SA in Tillman’s Ranger element.  A FBCB2 / Blue Force Tracker (GPS-fed, vehicle-mounted or hand held C2/SA system) capability would have given all elements involved a visual depiction of where mounted and dismounted friendly forces were located—assuming, of course, that all vehicles and dismounted elements involved were so equipped.  Knowing where blue entities were in the battlespace in combination with the proper mix of target identification systems would of enabled vehicle’s commander to properly guide their element’s crew-served weapons gunners onto enemy targets—as well as to prevent them from engaging friendly forces.

Target Identification (TI): TI is the process of determining the affiliation (blue, red, neutral) of detected objects at the point of engagement in one’s immediate battlespace.  This is normally conducted within line of sight visual range and is for the purpose of applying combat power or fires effects against enemy entities or targets, while preventing fratricide and minimizing collateral damage.  There are two categories of TI – cooperative target identification (CTI) and non-cooperative target identification (NCTI). CTI includes any method or materiel solution that allows a human shooter/sensor to “interrogate or question” a potential target, and allows the same potential target to “respond or answer” the interrogator in a timely manner.  Air to Air and Ground to Air systems use of IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) Mode 4, and Ground to Ground systems, in the near future, may use Battlefield Target Identification Device (BTID) and Radio Based Combat Identification (RBCI) CTI systems.  Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) is a misnomer as none of the CTI technologies identify Foe, they only Identify Friend or Unknown (IFU) entities. NCTI involves methods or systems that exploit the physical characteristics of entities in the battlespace to help identify and determine affiliation, and does not require a cooperative response or answer from the target.  NCTI systems include optics (forward-looking infrared [FLIR], NVGs and binoculars), vehicle and personnel markings (Joint Combat Identification Marking Systems [JCIMS], which include Combat ID Panels [CIPs], Thermal ID Panels [TIPs], Phoenix Beacons [infrared lights lights] and Dismounted Combat Identification Marking System [DCIMS- (TIP panel that is form fitted to a Kevlar helmet, giving a reverse polarity image through a FLIR device), and Automated Target Recognition (ATR) devices.  JCIMS marking systems are used in conjunction with FLIR optics and Night Vision Goggles and assist in friendly identification at the point of engagement.

In this example, Serial 2 (or the Platoon for that matter) did not have adequate optics. Thermal sights for HMMWV-mounted crew served weapons (AN/PAS-13s or Enhanced Night Vision Goggles (ENVG), for example) combined with reverse-polarity markings and/or thermal ballistic helmet covers on all soldiers would have enabled turret gunners to identify the dismounted Rangers in Serial 1 as friendly entities.  Technology combined with a rehearsed TTP to avoid fratricide and adherence to ROE could have prevented this occurrence. Each “link” of the CID chain was broken. Tillman’s group would have benefited from other NCTI devices such as infrared (IR) beacons for limited visibility operations (seen through AN/PVS-7B/D or PVS-14 night vision goggles that every soldier currently is issued) or a day-visible strobe light. A CTI technology that services Ground to Ground domains (“platform to platform,” “platform to soldier,” “soldier to soldier,” “soldier to platform”) would have been an additional tool at the point of engagement that would have enabled both serials to identify unknowns as friends. Unfortunately, the direct fire CTI technology [Battlefield Target Identification Device BTID)] currently being  recommended for an acquisition strategy for the US Army and USMC services only one domain—“platform to platform”—and interrogates only targets from M1, M2/M3, and Stryker vehicles.

In the Tillman example, even if the HMMWVs are replaced by armored vehicles equipped with BTID, the fratricide still could have still occurred—since BTID does not work within the “platform to soldier” domain.  This weakness in the CID “link” does not enable the firer to gain positive identification (PID) of the unknown dismounted entity. In the example, Serial 2 in turn broke both the second (“Identify”) and third links (“Shoot/Don’t Shoot”):  ROE was not satisfied by the gunners manning the crew served weapons on the HMMWVs; and Positive Identification (PID) was not gained by the firing element.  In addition, a TTP (i.e. smoke grenade signal), was not established or trained prior to the engagement (or not comprehended during the engagement) as a signal to cease fire in case of friendly fire situations. The Serial 2 firing platform could have used additional procedures to prevent the fratricide: transmitting the location of the unknown entity to another element (e.g. higher headquarters) to gain PID; by maneuvering to a position of advantage until PID could be acquired; or by using the proposed DIDEA (Detect, Identify, Decide, Engage, and Assess) Target Engagement Process (discussed later in this article).

In this highly publicized incident, very well trained Rangers were placed in a situation where they did not have the proper CID family of capabilities and in the heat of failed to correctly implement their training and ROE procedures.  The end result was a costly decision that led to a fatal fratricide incident.

 Better CID Capabilities  The ability of a CTI technology to service multiple domains has gained importance since Operation Desert Storm (ODS). Fratricide studies have illustrated a 25% increase in “platform to soldier” incidents and an increase in “soldier to soldier” incidents by 10% during recent Major Combat Operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF.)  The two CTI technologies recently approved for acquisition strategy do not address or fill this CID gap. BTID services only the “platform to platform” domain (M1, M2/M3, Stryker, and LRAS3) where as Radio Based Combat Identification (RBCI) addresses the Ground to Ground and Air to Ground domains from an indirect and Close Air Support perspective. None of these technologies directly address the “platform to soldier” and “soldier to soldier” domains. Regardless of what CTI technology is used, the combatant must still make the final determination whether to engage the unknown entity, based on blue, red or neutral status.  Once determined, the combatant must incorporate the ROE criteria and restrictions into his “shoot/don’t shoot” decision. Positive visual identification (PID) of the entity to determine if it is a legitimate military target must also be ascertained. There does not exist a technology that identifies friend or foe (IFF). CTI technologies only identify friend or unknown (IFU). A CTI technology should not be used as the sole criteria for engagement due to its mechanical/electronic nature or due to enemy action (electronic countermeasures [ECM]) that might render the CTI technology inoperative.  In addition, partial fielding (either through design or system failure) of CTI technology has been proven to increase fratricide, not decrease it, as crews rely on the technology as the sole criteria to engage or not engage an unknown entity.

 A Comprehensive Targeting Process  Within the Doctrine/TTP/ROE (“Shoot / Don’t Shoot”) link of CID is the proposed targeting process known as Detect, Identify, Decide, Engage, and Assess (DIDEA). A review of current doctrine indicates there are several engagement processes associated with targeting.  Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-60 identifies a six step targeting process:  “Detect, Locate, Identify, Decide, Strike, and Assess.”  US Army FM 3-09.12 describes a generic four-step targeting process: “Detect, Decide, Deliver, and Assess.”  A multi-service TTP for time sensitive targeting called Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess was developed to support the prosecution of targets in Operation Iraqi Freedom. As was discovered in the 2004 Army-Marine Corps Board Ground to Ground (AMCB G-G) study, the problem with each of these processes is that CID and ROE application are implied tasks embedded within one of the performance steps. The “shoot/don’t shoot” decision incorporating ROE is not formally taught in professional military education courses—leading to another break in the “links” of the CID chain. As an overarching target engagement process, DIDEA would provide an iterative, standardized and systematic approach supporting the application of specific CID and ROE performance steps for lethal targeting across the user spectrum (from individual infantryman through indirect fire controllers and beyond). DIDEA is generic enough to be used as a systematic process for C2 node targeting planning as well as decision-making. Such a process incorporated into doctrine would serve as a baseline for professional military education. The individual actions of the DIDEA process are summarized below.

Detect – the acquisition and location of an object in the battlespace.  This first step in the Target Engagement Process can entail the use of visual, RADAR, electronic signals measurement, or other means for detecting and locating objects in the battlespace. Identify – a systematic process supporting the characterization of detected objects as friend, enemy, or neutral.  This is the primary step where specified CID tasks are accomplished.  It commences after an object is detected and located and provides a systematic process whereby the attributes of a detected object are systematically processed to support a friend, enemy, or neutral determination.  Decide – determination of appropriate application of military options and weapons resources on identified objects.  This is the most generic step within the process and is the primary step where specified ROE application takes place.  Specific sub-steps within the Decide phase will vary depending on the weapon system/platform and mission application.  (Bursting radius of indirect fire/CAS delivered munitions as well as ground platform surface danger areas must be taken into account in this step due to proximity of friendly or neutral entities).  In some cases the decision may be made to employ military options other than weapons systems (i.e. the repositioning of ISR assets for further monitoring of identified objects, etc).  In those cases where a weapons resource application is being considered, this phase would primarily address the following questions: 1) Can I engage (ROE application)? 2) If multiple targets, what to engage first (Severity of threat, commander’s intent/high pay-off targets, high value targets.)? 3) What is the best weapons system to engage with (Lethal/non-lethal, munitions effect, co-lateral damage assessment)? Engage – specific application of military options/weapons resources.  In this step the mechanical process of carrying out the decision made in the previous step takes place. Assess – did the applied weapons resources bring about the desired effect.  In this step we assess the effects of the engagement phase (battle damage assessment) against desired outcomes.  If the desired outcome was not achieved, a decision to re-engage the target could be made.

DIDEA would serve as a Target Engagement Process requirement and support the insertion of specified CID and ROE tasks into service training standards and programs of instruction. Individual platforms and mission applications would have specific sub-sets within the DIDEA process that would account for the specific processes and mission applications of that platform.vi]

 A Holistic CID Solution Progress has been made since the Tillman incident.   Per the recommendation of the AMCB G-G CID Study, the Training, Doctrine and Combat Development Division at Fort Knox, Kentucky, assisted by the TRADOC Capability Manager Platform Battle Command/Combat Identification (TCM PBC / CID) and the TRADOC Centers, selected a vendor in March 2006 to address issues associated with the incorporation of CID into Army doctrine.  Comprehensive CID doctrine will be developed for inclusion into US Army FM 3.90, Tactics (publication date: 4 July 2001) that explains how to increase combat effectiveness in relation to combat identification requirements, including but not limited to SA, TI, TTP and ROE. The CID input will address the Ground to Ground (“platform to platform,” “platform to soldier,” “soldier to soldier,” “soldier to platform”), Air to Ground (rotary-wing aircraft-platform to soldier and UAV-platform to soldier), and Ground to Air mission areas.

Gunnery doctrine will be updated to incorporate Combat Identification requirements, to include but not limited to, insertion of friendly, allied/coalition and neutral targets, and refinement of direct fire target engagement processes.  Existing gunnery manuals for Armor/Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, Air Defense, and Aviation will be reviewed to identify deficiencies in addressing CID-related tasks.  This doctrine shall be for the entire Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), including Armor, Infantry, mortar gunnery, Engineers, and CASCOM and should be used as a template for the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) manuals.  The doctrinal effort will take approximately 12 months to complete following initiation in March 2006.  This effort will strengthen the Doctrine/TTP/ROE (“Engage or Do Not Engage”) “link” of the SA + TI chain.

Improvements in the current family of systems (FBCB2/JBC-P, Optics, 2/3 GENFLIR, JCIMS) enabling the “sensor-to-shooter kill-chain” to better see the targeted entity can be enhanced through the acquisition of a CTI that services all of the Ground to Ground domains and one that addresses the Air to Ground Mission Area, such as RBCI.  Future CTI systems that enter into an acquisition strategy should service as many domains as possible to fully address our CID gaps.

Fratricide incidents are still occurring during stability operations in Iraq and are being committed by platforms other than armored.  A system like BTID would have no positive impact on these incidents.  Acquisition of a CTI technology that services all domains will strengthen the family of systems (“See the entity”) link in the CID equation. Until that occurs and the doctrinal/facility gap mitigation measures are in place (identified and funded by the AMCB G-G study), fratricides in full spectrum operations will likely continue to occur.

The fog of war and the human factor makes total elimination of fratricide impossible. Marksmanship and “muscle memory” (the ability to conduct crew drills/battle drills under stressful conditions, i.e. fire commands, fire control systems switch manipulation) training remains a “must” in order to maintain lethal crews and soldiers, and is necessary to simultaneously protect the force from fratricide.  The contemporary operating environment drives the need for a target discrimination skill-set for all soldiers, trained within the context of the DIDEA shoot / don’t shoot targeting process.  This standard of training grounded in solid doctrinal principles will hone the warfighter’s judgment at the point of engagement.  Family of system and doctrinal improvements coupled with improved training devices (Recognition of Combat Vehicles (ROC-V), simulations, and realistic ranges with blue, red and neutral targetry incorporating shoot/don’t shoot decision making) will enable the soldier to make better decisions on whether or not to engage an unknown entity. The combatant must be able to ask themselves the question if unsure whether to shoot or not: (1) Am I or my friends in mortal danger? (2) What is the worse thing that can happen if I pull the trigger? (3) Am I positive that my target is hostile?

There is no “silver bullet” solution to end all fratricide incidents.  The emphasis should be placed upon improving density of SA and TI systems in the Army inventory, preparing the combatant for full spectrum operations and acquiring a CTI technology to service all domains in the Ground to Ground mission area.  This can only be accomplished by looking at CID through a holistic lens and by strengthening every link of the CID (SA+TI [Family of Systems + Training + Doctrine/TTP/ROE]) chain.  It is imperative that we do everything possible to prevent unfortunate incidents like the Tillman fratricide from occurring in the future.

 

About the Author

Major Edward Ospital is the Combat Identification Branch Chief for the TRADOC Capability Manager Platform Battle Command / Combat Identification (TCM PBC/CID) at Ft. Knox, KY. He is a 1989 Distinguished Military Graduate from the California State University Sacramento ROTC program and holds a MBA. He is a graduate of Armor OBC, Armor Career Course, Ranger School, Airborne School, 2ID Sniper School, Scout Leader's Course, and the Acquisition Basic Course. Major Ospital has served in various civilian law enforcement and Armor/Cavalry command and staff positions in the continental United States, Korea, and Germany.

CPT Adam N. Wojack is the S3 Plans Officer for the 2nd "Dagger" Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division at Camp Liberty, Iraq. He was a Distinguished Military Graduate from U.S. Army Officer Candidate School in 1997, and commanded Alpha Company, 1-26 Infantry in Schweinfurt, Germany. He has a B.A. in English from Baruch College in New York City and has served in various leadership and staff positions in Iraq, Kosovo, Germany, Hawaii, Fort Campbell, Panama and Korea.

Air Force question...anything related to ground combat? Air Force good idea?

Ive been planning on going to the marines for about 2 years now but i don't want to rush into and not look at all my options.What are your thought about the AF? I was wondering if their are any Air Force 'jobs' that involve any kind of ground combat, or anything that is closely related. ANY information would be greatly appreciated. Thanks in advance.

The Air Force only has four combat arms (ground combat) jobs. Three of them are Special Operations and have fairly high attrition rates so they aren't something you'd want to enter into lightly.

The Special Operations careerfields are:

Pararescue
Combat Control Teams
Special Operations Weather Teams

The fourth careerfield is called TACP (Tactical Air Control Party) and may interest you if you were looking at infantry. As a TACP you would be assigned to Army infantry, you would live with them, train with them and fight with them. Your primary duties consist of calling in Close Air Support (CAS) for them when things get tough as well as providing standard infantry support.

If you're interested in the Air Force .. research all of those jobs and talk to the recruiter about them.

Take your time in deciding what you want to do .. Marines or Air Force, it's your future and so choosing the one that's best for YOU is what will matter in 4 years when it's time for you to reenlist.

Hope this helps

EDIT: Replied to your e-mail.

For those that doubt USAF has ground combat jobs (those I listed above) please do a little research, the information is out there for those that want accurate answers.

Visual Air Combat